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LEIBNIZ'S MONADIC 
TREATMENT OF RELATIONS 
DONALD MERTZ 
I. Introduction 
Leibniz understood, perhaps better than most 
metaphysicans, the importance of relations as the 
cement that binds possible worlds together, that gives 
them wholeness and structure, and that makes for their 
intelligibility. He expresses this, for instance, in 
his often repeated position that each monadic 
substance, though self-sufficient and causally isolated 
from all others, is nevertheless mutually connected 
with them by an infinity of "relations that express all 
others," and which make each monad "a perpetual living 
mirror of the universe." And again he says, "There is 
no term so absolute or detached as not to include 
relations, and the perfect analysis of which does not 
lead to other things and even to all others." It is 
because of these and other uses of relations in his 
metaphysics, which contrasted with a brief though 
interesting logical treatment appearing to eliminate 
them, that has made Leibniz's theory of relations the 
subject of increasing philosophical attention. 
Relatively recent studies in this area have not only 
served to rectify previous misconceptions, but also to 
clarify certain aspects of Leibniz's logic and 
metaphysics. 
For example, Russell's classic position, that 
Leibniz sought to eliminate all relations by a 
reduction to non-relational attributes, has been shown 
to be inaccurate. H. Ishiguro and J. Hintikka have 
argued that Leibniz's often repeated position of the 
non-existence of relations is not a proposition of his 
logical theory, but a metaphysical position as to what 
exist with the same ontic status as monadic substances. 
They point out that on a close examination of his few 
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examples, Leibniz's program ..of a "rational grammer" 
(Grammaticae Cogitationes) for the re-writing of 
relational propositions into certain other forms, is 
not an attempt to eliminate relational concepts, but an 
attempt to make relational statements amenable to 
traditional subject/predicate argument forms. 
Further, Hintikka has shown with the help of modern 
logic that Leibniz's distinction between "possibility" 
and "compossibility" would be one without a difference 
so long as relational concepts are not fully admitted. 
Likewise, Ishiguro rightly points out that Leibniz's 
"mirror thesis," that every individual "expresses" or 
mirrors the whole universe from its point of view, is 
intelligible only when relationsQexist among subjects to furnish this intercon-nection. 
Continuing, then, in the direction of these 
studies, it will be the purpose of this paper to 
explicate further the exact form of Leibniz's brief 
logical/syntactical program for relations, and then to 
contrast this with his metaphysical/semantical 
treatment of them. It will be seen from this analysis 
that there is a similar though not identical treatment 
of relations under both programs. This similarity lies 
in Leibniz's treating multi-term relations as one-term, 
monadic predicates with all other term-places being 
either instantiated, or bound by existential 
quantifiers, depending on the program. It will be 
evident that Leibniz is not attempting to eliminate 
relations in favor of attributes, and that in fact his 
logical program requires his introducing a new 
relational connective between propositions. Finally, I 
will show how relations can once again be used to 
clarify a difficult point of Leibniz's metaphysics. 
Namely, how it is possible that positive concepts, 
which go to make up each individual's "complete 
concept" and so render it distinct, can be either 
compatible or incompatible. This latter problem 
puzzled Leibniz and commentators since. 
11. The Grammer of Relational Paraphrase 
According to Leibniz, relations are of two kinds, 
those of comparison and those of connection 
(comparationis vel connexionis). The examples of 
paraphrase that lie gives differ according to whether 
the relation is one or the other of the two kinds. As 
examples of relations of comparison he lists those of 
resemblance, equality, inequality, identity, and 
diversity, and as examples of relations of connection 
those of cause and effect, of whole and part, of 
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position and order, and of predication of existence. 
It is significant that the former are all symmetric, or 
more particularly, equivalence relations or their 
denials, while the latter are asymmetric on non-
symmetric relations. 
Now, it is clear from the following examples that 
Leibniz thought that at least some propositions 
expressing relations of comparison could be reduced to 
a truth-functional conjunction of propositions of the 
subject/predicate form, i.e., as containing one-place, 
monadic predicates. He gives as an example: 
All oblique inferences - e.g., 'Peter is 
similar to Paul, therefore Paul is similar to 
Peter' - are to be explained by explanations 
of words. Such may be seen from the logic of 
Jungius. It is reduced to the proposition 
'Peter is A now' and 'Paul is A now'. 
The proposition "Peter is similar to Paul" is here 
paraphrased into the conjunction of the two attribute-
like propositions, "Peter is A now" and "Paul is A 
now." This is a common sense reduction, for to say 
that two subjects are similar is to say that they share 
some common property which as such renders them alike. 
But more precisely, the form of the above paraphrase 
implies that the predicate "is similar to" is something 
like a second order relation that exists among the two 
subjects, Peter and Paul, and this due to the fact that 
both subjects possess the same first order predicate, 
"is A now." Though Leibniz's paraphrase eliminates as 
explicit the second order relation "is similar to," it 
retains the shared first order predicate, and 
importantly, it is possible for this shared predicate 
to be either an attribute or a relation. For, even 
though "is A now" is syntactically monadic, A could be 
intensionally either a true monadic attribute, e.g., 
"is just," or yet remain a relation, e.g., in the form 
of "is taller than John." In the latter case, to use 
modern parlence, we have a two-place relational 
predicate with only one free varibale, 'x is taller 
than John,' where the variable x would be instantiated 
by both Peter and Paul. In general, since the above 
reduction is possible for any equivalence relation, it 
would cover all cases of Leibniz's relations of 
comparison. 
In examples dealing with the asymmetric or non-
symmetric relations of connection, Leibniz is more 
explicit in retaining relational predicates. He gives 
as an example the sentence "Titus is wiser that Caius" 
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which, using a special logical connective, he re-writes 
as, 
Titus is wise and as such (qua talis) is 
superior, to the extent that (quatenus), Caius 
qua wise is inferior. 
Here there is no elimination of relational predicates 
because the resulting two predicates of the paraphrase 
are respectively the relations Mis superior in wisdom" 
and "is inferior in wisdom." These predicates are 
binary relations made implicit by the suppression of 
one relata. That is, Titus can be superior in wisdom 
only with respect to another subject who is not as 
wise, whether this latter subject is given explicitly 
or not. In leaving the second relata unspecified in 
both predicates, Leibniz is in effect treating these 
two-place relations as syntactically monadic. This 
procedure of regarding relations as one-place 
predicates without specifying the all but one 
suppressed relata is common to modern logic and is 
handled with the use of bound variables. For example, 
the sentence "Titus is wise and as such is superior" 
would translate to "( x)(Titus is wiser than x ) . " 
Likewise, "Caius qua wise is inferior" becomes "( y)(y 
is wiser than Caius)." Written as such, the predicate 
( x)( is wiser than x) is seen as a relational 
though one-place predicate attributable to Titus. 
Thus, Leibniz would appear so far to be following a 
simple grammatical procedure; that for relations to be 
treated grammatically like attributes, they must, like 
attributes, be predicated ostensively of one subject. 
This requires that the other relata be suppressed, or, 
as we would now say, referred to indefinitely by the 
use of an existential quantifier which ranges over 
variables instantiated by the suppressed relata. This 
procedure, however, has the disadvantage of requiring 
Leibniz to introduce special propositional connectives 
to circuitously re-establish the connection between the 
given relata, a connection that is lost when the relata 
are suppressed in the paraphrase. 
An understanding of Leibniz's need for the special 
propositional connective "to the extent that," or 
alternately, "by virtue of the fact," comes upon 
observing that the simple conjoining of the two 
paraphrased propositions by the ordinary truth-
functional connectives is inadequate to determine an 
equivalence to the original proposition. For example, 
the conjunction, ( x)( y)(Titus is wiser than x, and y 
is wiser than Caius), is too weak in that it does not 
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imply the original proposition, Titus is wiser than 
Caius. This is also true when a biconditional is used. 
The failure of an equivalence with the use of truth-
functional connectives is due to the fact that when 
they are used the two specific relata, Titus and Caius, 
remain unrelated. All we know, for example, by the use 
of a conjunction "and," as above, is that there is 
someone who Titus is wiser than, and that there is 
someone, not necessarily the same person, who is wiser 
than Caius. 
More than a standard truth-functional connective is 
needed, therefore, to link the internal propositional 
constituents of Titus and Caius as the actual two 
subjects being related here. Leibniz is aware of this 
in introducing the special connective "to the extent 
that." What he intended by this connective is unclear, 
however I would offer the following as a plausible 
interpretation. Leibniz's paraphrase could be re-
written as: By the same instance of the relation "is 
wiser than," Titus is superior in wisdom and" Caius is 
inferior in wisdom. This accomplishes the task of re-
establishing the link between Titus and Caius without 
mentioning them, and does so in the only other possible 
way by referring to the relation they share in the 
particular instance in which they share it. This 
interpretation also has the necessary advantage of 
being logically equivalent to the original proposition, 
Titus is wiser that Caius. That this is Leibniz's 
intent may come out more clearly in the following 
example. 
Leibniz writes, 
This will be the best way of explaining 'Paris 
is the lover of Helen', that is, 'Paris loves, 
and by that very fact (et eo ipso) Helen is 
loved.' Here, therefore, two propositions 
have been brought together and abbreviated 
into one. Or, 'Paris is a lover. 5and by that very fact Helen is a loved one.' 
Here again the two resulting sentences contain 
concealed dyadic predicates which are represented as 
syntactically monadic, and again with one bound 
variable. Partially translated, Paris loves someone, 
and Helen is loved by someone, i.e., ( x)(Paris loves 
x) and ( y)(y loves Helen). Here, as in the previous 
example, the special connective, et eo ipso, shows that 
the original proposition is not simply a truth-
functional conjunction of the two paraphrase 
constituents. The conjunction "Paris loves and Helen 
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is loved" does not have the meaning, nor is truth-
functional equivalent to, the original proposition 
expressed by "Paris is the lover of Helen." This is so 
here, as in the previous example, because there is no 
link, stated or that can be inferred, connecting to 
each other the two relata, Paris and Helen. Since this 
connection can only be achieved by referring to the 
same instance of the relation of loving, the connective 
et eo ipso must translate the same as the previous 
quatenus .• That is, "and by that very fact" must 
translate to: Bjy the same instance of the relation of 
loving, Paris loves y, and x loves Helen. The special 
connective will then serve to identify exactly who is 
loving who. 
From the above examples it is evident that Leibniz 
is not attempting to eliminate relational predicates by 
a reduction to true monadic attributes. Relations, in 
fact, remain elements of the paraphrases, but are 
treated as syntactically monadic, and here in the 
particular mode of containing one bound variable. 
Moreover, it is this bound variable mode that requires 
Leibniz to introduce these connectives. As will become 
clear below, his treatment of relations as monadic 
predicates containing instantiated rather than bound 
variables requires no such analog to these connectives. 
In addition, it is important to note that the special 
connectives, which under our interpretation turn out to 
be the same, are themselves relations between 
propositions. They are, as it were, second order 
relations which serve to combine the two monadic, 
attribute-like occurrences of the re-written first 
order relations. At any rate, from the vantage of 
modern logic Leibniz's grammatical program is awkward, 
to say the least. It is, nevertheless, a clear attempt 
to retain relations but to make them function 
syntactically as one place predicates. As will be 
seen, this program is analogous to his 
metaphysical/semantical treatment of relations, though 
with a significant difference. 
III. Relations in Complete Concepts 
In contrast to the above, a formal explication of 
Leibniz's metaphysical/semantical program for relations 
is more immediate. Semantics is concerned with the 
interpretation of signs whereby they have meaning 
and/or truth, and for Leibniz the fundamental unit of 
truth is the proposition. However, propositions are 
complex terms whose constituent simple terms stand for 
the fundamental units of meaning, i.e., concepts of 
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ideas. What Leibniz understood by a concept or idea 
is very similar to the Platonic theory of Forms, as he 
himself points out. An idea is an immediate object of 
thought, and is a permanent form or essence, .ultimately 
existing and objectified in the mind of God. 
Leibniz's constant and repeated position is that an 
affirmative proposition is true when the predicate 
concept is a constituent of the subject concept, or is 
identical with it. This is no less the case for 
relational propositions, i.e., those of "extrinsic 
denomination." 
A reason can be given for every truth 
(which is not identical or immediate), that 
is, that the notion of the predicate is always 
expressely or implicitly contained in the 
notion of its subject, and this holds good no 
less in extrinsic than an intrinsic 
denominations, no less in contingent than in 
necessary truths . . . 
Further, when the subject of a proposition is an 
individual substance, or monad, the predicate is 
contained in what Leibniz calls the "complete concept" 
of that individual. By a complete concept he means a 
maximal set of compatible simple predicates satisfiable 
by exactly one individual. This set is maximal in the 
sense that the addition of any proposed concept would 
either be redundant or make for a contradiction. A 
"possible world" is then, in turn, a maximal set of 
these complete concepts which are mutually 
compossible. In any possible world each individual's 
complete concept is a plenum of all mutually compatible 
attributes and relations, past, present, and future 
that the corresponding substance will ever have in that 
world. In particular, this abundance includes 
infinitely many relations connecting each individual to 
every other. 
Now this mutual connection or accomodation of 
all created things to each other and of each 
to all the rest causes each simple substance 
to have relations which express all the others 
and consequently to be a perpetual living 
mirror of the universe. 
Leibniz states that by a monad expressing the universe 
he means that there is "a constant and regulated 
relation between what can be said (i-e., the 
predicates) of the one and of the other . . . " That 
is, the constituent concepts of any given individual's 
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complete concept must be reflected in some manner in 
the constituent concepts of every other complete 
concept. 
The pertinent point here is the specific manner in 
which relations are contained in and are reflected 
amongst these individual concepts. Leibniz writes, 
I say that the concept of an individual 
substance includes all its events and all its 
denominations, even those which are commonly 
called extrinsic, that is, those which pertain 
to it only by virtue of the general connection 
of the things and from the fact that it 
expresses the whole universe in its own way. 
Elsewhere he writes, " . . . there must be a plurality 
of affections and relations in the simple substance, 
even though it has no parts." In other words, an 
analysis of an individual's complete concept by a 
sufficient intelligence would ultimately lead to the 
knowledge of every substance, each as a relata in its 
mirrored correspondence with that individual. As we 
saw earlier, "There is no term so absolute or detached 
as not to include relations, and the perfect analysis 
of whichcdoes not lead to other things and even to all 
others. If we state this formally, Leibniz's position 
is equivalent to the fact that relational predicates 
are contained in their subjects as multi-term 
predicates, but with all the terms given or 
instantiated, save one. For example, an analysis of 
the complete concept of Paris would yield not the two-
place relational predicate "x loves y," but the one-
place relational predicate "x loves Helen." In 
general, an n-place relational predicate would be 
contained in its subject as a predicate with n-1 
instantiated variables, and one free variable in the 
place of the subject from which it was analyzed. 
It is, then, this monadic mode of relational 
containment that provides the mechanism for explaining 
how an analysis of a singular concept, such as that of 
Paris, can lead to, and thus "express" from its own 
"perspective," another singular concept, e.g., that of 
Helen. As such, this special containment functions as 
the metaphysical analog of the special connectives of 
Leibniz's grammatical program. In both treatments, 
relations are not eliminated in favor of simple 
attributes, but are retained in the attribute-like form 
of monadic predicates. The specific form differs 
according to Leibniz's purpose; suppressed relata in 
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the form of bound variables in the one, fully given and 
instantiated relata in the other. 
IV. The Necessity of Relations 
Rendering explicit the monadic containment of 
relations within complex concepts helps to clarify 
certain of Leibniz's most ambiguous and misinterpreted 
passages and positions. To take just one example of 
such a passage, Leibniz refers to the proposition: 
"David is the father of Solomon." 
In reference to this proposition he maintains that: 
This I hold, as regards relations, that 
paternity in David is one thing and filiation 
in Solomon another, but the relation common to 
both is a mere mental thing, of which the 
modifications of singulars are the 
foundation. 
The "modifications of singulars" here would be the 
monadic relational predicates "x is the father of 
Solomon" (i.e., filiation in Solomon) and "David is the 
father of y" (i.e., paternity in David). The "mere 
mental thing" is the relation "common to both," in 
other words, the abstract relation "x is father of y," 
which as such is totally uninstantiated and unconnected 
to any individual. Likewise, Leibniz states in another 
misinterpreted passage, "Therefore we must say that 
this relation in this third way of considering it 
(i.e., x is greater thay y) is indeed out of the 
subject; Being neither a substance.nor an accident it 
must be a mere ideal thing . . . " The PQint is that 
relations have their "foundation in things" precisely 
in their monadic mode, but when otherwise abstracteg 
from any relata they are merely ens mentale. 
Therefore, this passage can not be interpreted as 
implying, that relations are trivial and can in the last 
analysis be eliminated, nor that they are necessary 
only in some psychological sense. Relations in the 
monadic mode have the same ontic status as any of the 
other concepts that they do combine with, and concepts 
are for Leibniz "absolute forms." 
Finally, it is interesting to see yet another case 
where relations, particularly in their 
monadic/instantiated form, can be used to clarify an 
otherwise difficult point in Leibniz's metaphysics. As 
indicated above, an individual's complete concept is a 
class composed of an infinity of simple concepts. 
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Leibniz states that all simple attributes are 
•positive,' and that *•. .- 2 all purely positive terms are compatible inter se." The question then becomes; 
how is it possible for any class of positive concepts 
to be compatible or incompatible with any other such 
class? That is, howTs it that one object's having a 
positive predicate P can logically imply or exclude 
another object's having a positive predicate Q. There 
must be some incompatible simple concepts for otherwise 
there would be but one complete concept and therefore 
but one individual. Leibniz, as commentators after, 
found this to be_a great mystery understandable by God 
but not by man. 
This problem is easily solved, however, when one 
extends "simple attributes" to include relational 
predicates in the above monadic form, i.e., 
instantiated with all relata save one for the subject. 
For example, if we let P be the simple and positive 
predicate "x loves Helen," and likewise Q to be "Paris 
loves y," then the individual Paris in having the 
predicate P logically implies that the individual Helen 
has the predicate Q, and conversely. Therefore, the 
predicates P and Q are compatible, and to that extent 
so are the containing concepts of Paris and Helen. Or, 
take as an example the case where individual A is 
taller than individual B. The complete concept of A, 
insofar as it contains the positive monadic predicate 
"x is taller than B," implies and is therefore 
compatible with the complete concept of B, insofar as 
it contains the predicate "A is taller than y." On the 
other hand, if A had a complete concept that included 
the predicate "x is taller than B" and B a complete 
concept that included the predicate "x is taller than 
A," then A and B would be logically incompatible in 
both being taller than the other. In such a case 
Leibniz is certainly correct in saying that A and B 
could not both occupy the same possible world. In 
brief, it is possible to make a distinction between 
compatible and incompatible positive relational 
concepts, and this distinction depends upon both the 
position of the specific relata in the n-place 
relation, as well as the kind of relation involved, 
i.e., reflexive/irreflexive, symmetric/assymmetric, 
transitive/intransitive. Recall that it was by means 
of the asymmetric property of some relations that 
Russell argued against Leibniz's supposed position, 
demonstrating that such relations are not reducible to 
attributes. Therefore, in saying that all positive 
terms are compatible inter se, Leibniz's difficulty 
arises in restricting "terms" to include only simple 
attributes, to the exclusion of monadic relational 
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predicates. For, just as Hintikka demonstrated the 
necessity of relations to found the distinction between 
possibility and compossibility, so we see here their 
role in rendering intelligible the difference between 
compatible and incompatible positive concepts. 
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